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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MARK WILLIAM HART,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 44615
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2016-441

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury found sixty-year-old Mark William Hart guilty of felony
driving under the influence. The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two
years fixed. Mr. Hart filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) motion for a reduction of
sentence, which the district court denied. On appeal, Mr. Hart asserts the district court abused its
discretion when it ordered his sentence into execution, rather than place him on probation, or
alternatively, retain jurisdiction. Mr. Hart also asserts the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In the early morning hours, Canyon County Sheriff’s Office Deputy Shearn went to the
scene of a reported slide-off accident at Highway 95 and Penny Lane in Canyon County. (See
Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)1 When Deputy Shearn arrived at the scene, he saw a
female, identified as Karen Johnson, standing outside a car. (PSI, p.3.) A male, identified as
Mr. Hart, was sitting in the driver’s seat of the car. (PSI, p.3.) The car’s front end was in a
wastewater ditch. (PSI, p.3.)
Deputy Shearn spoke with Ms. Johnson, who was upset and appeared to be afraid of
Mr. Hart. (PSI, p.3.) She denied she had been assaulted and stated all she wanted was to go
home. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Hart then got out of the car and began walking towards Ms. Johnson and
the deputy. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Hart appeared to have difficulty walking, and Deputy Shearn told
him to get back in the car. (PSI, p.3.) Deputy Shearn noted a strong odor of an alcoholic
beverage coming from Mr. Hart’s face. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Hart stated he had consumed a large
amount of alcohol earlier that night. (PSI, p.3.) He failed the administered field sobriety tests,
and was taken into custody on suspicion of driving under the influence. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Hart
provided two breath samples, with breath alcohol content results of .188 and .170. (PSI, p.3.) A
review of his driving record revealed two prior convictions for DUI. (PSI, p.3.)
The State charged Mr. Hart by Information with one count of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol (third offense), felony, I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005.
(R., pp.21-22.) The State also filed an Information Part II alleging Mr. Hart had two prior
convictions for DUI. (R., pp.23-24.) Mr. Hart entered a not guilty plea. (R., pp.25-26.)
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All citations to the PSI refer to the 60-page PDF version of the presentence report
and attachments.
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The case proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.55-62, 74-86.) The jury found Mr. Hart guilty
of driving under the influence, and that he had two prior convictions for DUI. (R., pp.87-88.)
The presentence report stated, “[b]ased on the level of assessed risk and need, and other
protective factors . . . the defendant appears to be a marginal candidate for an order of
probation.” (PSI, p.15.) At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court
impose a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. (Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.9, Ls.19-24.)
Mr. Hart recommended the district court place him on probation for a period of four years, or
alternatively, retain jurisdiction to send him on a “rider.” (See Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.13, L.21 –
p.14, L.7.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed.
(R., pp.118-19.)
Mr. Hart filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment and
Commitment. (R., pp.109-12; see R., pp.136-41 (Amended Notice of Appeal).)
Mr. Hart also filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to ICR 35. (R., pp.11617.) He later filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to ICR 35 and Request to
Supplement and for Hearing.

(R., pp.123-24.)

Mr. Hart subsequently filed Supplemental

Materials in Support of Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to ICR 35 and Request to
Supplement and for Hearing. (R., pp.127-30.) The district court then issued an Order Denying
Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35. (R., pp.131-35.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered into execution Mr. Hart’s
sentence, rather than place him on probation?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered into execution Mr. Hart’s
sentence, rather than retain jurisdiction?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hart’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Into Execution Mr. Hart’s Sentence,
Rather Than Place Him On Probation
Mr. Hart asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered his sentence
into execution rather than place him on probation, because it did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards. The district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards because it did not adequately consider factors falling within the criteria of Idaho
Code § 19-2521. The district court should have followed Mr. Hart’s recommendation and placed
him on probation for a period of four years.
“A trial court’s decision regarding whether imprisonment or probation is appropriate is
within its discretion.” State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278 (2002). When a district court’s
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry
into (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether
the district court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and (3) whether the district court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
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Before imposing and executing a sentence, a district court must consider the criteria set
forth in I.C. § 19-2521 regarding whether a defendant should be placed on probation. See Reber,
138 Idaho at 278. “A decision to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it
is consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.” Id. Section 19-2521 provides that a
sentencing court,
shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing
sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances
of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the
opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public because:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation
the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most
effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime; or
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the
defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in the
community; or
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.
I.C. § 19-2521(1).

Additionally, while not controlling the discretion of the court, the

following grounds,
shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment:
(a) The defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened harm;
(b) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or
threaten harm;
(c) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's
criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
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(e) The victim of the defendant’s criminal conduct induced or facilitated the
commission of the crime;
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal
conduct for the damage or injury that was sustained; provided, however, nothing
in this section shall prevent the appropriate use of imprisonment and restitution in
combination;
(g) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has
led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the
present crime;
(h) The defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to
recur; [and]
(i) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that the commission of
another crime is unlikely.
I.C. § 19-2521(2). However, a district court need not “recite the statutory criteria of I.C. § 192521, or its application of the facts to those criteria in rendering its decision on probation.”
Reber, 138 Idaho at 278.
Mr. Hart asserts that the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards when it declined to place him on probation, because it did not adequately consider
factors falling within the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521. Specifically, the instant offense is Mr. Hart’s
first felony conviction. While Mr. Hart had five prior convictions for misdemeanor driving
under the influence offenses (see PSI, pp.4-7), the instant offense is his first felony conviction
(see PSI, pp.4-7; Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.9, Ls.19-22).
Additionally, Mr. Hart has maintained periods of sobriety for years at a time, and his
convictions for driving under the influence were connected to traumatic experiences in his life.
Mr. Hart’s GAIN-I assessment diagnosed him with “Alcohol Dependence w/out Physiological
Sx.,” based on his self-reported symptoms.

(PSI, pp.17-18.)

During the presentence

investigation, Mr. Hart stated “he has maintained sobriety for years at a time, and has relapsed
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due to ‘traumatic experiences.’” (PSI, p.11.) In his statement to the district court at the
sentencing hearing, Mr. Hart described the circumstances related to four of his prior convictions.
(See Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.18, L.17 – p.19, L.9.) In 1993, his mother was dying. (See PSI, p.4;
Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.19, Ls.7-8.) In 2001, his offense followed 9/11. (See PSI, p.5; Tr., Oct. 31,
2016, p.19, L.7.) In 2003, his wife had cancer, they were going to cancer treatment, and he was
extremely upset. (See PSI, p.5; Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.19, Ls.3-5.) Mr. Hart also explained “there
was something in a personal tragedy” in 2006, when “I had a terrible injury to my head and neck
and back. And I made the decision to go to my father’s – father-in-law’s funeral.” (See PSI, p.6;
Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.18, Ls.17-21.)
Similarly, the instant offense was connected to another traumatic experience, the death of
Mr. Hart’s stepson. In the Presentence Investigation Questionnaire, Mr. Hart wrote that at the
time of the offense here, “[m]y other son Luke was dying in [Kalispell,] Montana. Under the
circumstances I wasn’t doing very well.” (See PSI, p.3.) Luke Amenkowicz was one of
Mr. Hart’s stepsons. (See PSI, p.9.) Mr. Hart’s bond in this case was initially set at $250,000
(R., p.16), and then reduced to $150,000 (R., pp.18-19). After Mr. Hart filed a motion for bond
reduction (R., pp.27-30), his bond was reduced to $100,000 (R., pp.31-32). In his statement to
the district court at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Hart characterized his bail as excessive. (See
Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.15, L.25 – p.16, L.21.) Mr. Hart asserted, “[b]ecause of this, I was
incarcerated while my stepson, whom I raised, got deathly sick and died an extremely painful
death.” (Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.16, Ls.21-23.)
Mr. Hart is now ready to overcome his issues with substance abuse. He had an aggregate
LSIR score of 17, placing him in the Moderate Risk category. (PSI, p.13.) In his GAIN-I
assessment, Mr. Hart “reported that he has quit using substances and is about 100% ready to
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remain abstinent.”

(PSI, p.22.)

The GAIN-I assessment recommended that Mr. Hart

“[c]omplete Level II.1 Intensive Outpatient treatment.” (PSI, p.26.) The presentence report
stated Mr. Hart “appears willing to fulfill legal obligations and abide by treatment
recommendations.” (PSI, p.15.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Hart told the district court, “I’ve
attended all programs during my incarceration here to meet the substance abuse counseling
requirements.” (Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.18, Ls.2-4.) Mr. Hart had informed his counsel he had
“been doing Celebrate Recovery in the jail.” (See Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.12, Ls.2-4.)
Further, Mr. Hart has been dealing with his own health problems. During the presentence
investigation, Mr. Hart “reported he suffers from chronic pain resulting from severe injuries he
received at the age of 22, when he was struck by a drunk driver.” (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Hart “has
been treated for migraine headaches and hypothyroidism. He was diagnosed as, ‘Borderline
diabetic’ in 2011.” (PSI, p.10.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Hart’s counsel informed the
district court, “being in custody, being over in pod 5, in the tent, has exacerbated his ongoing
pain.” (Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.12, L.25 – p.13, L.2.) Mr. Hart had told counsel he dealt with his
pain “with a very regimented diet outside of the jail, and that that, along with meditation, helps
him deal with his pain, but that both of those things are hard to accomplish while he’s in custody
at this time.” (Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.13, Ls.2-8.) Mr. Hart’s counsel asserted that “if we don’t
give Mr. Hart the right opportunity to proceed forward and to deal with his pain and deal with his
issues here with alcohol, I think we’re setting him up for failure in the long run.” (Tr., Oct. 31,
2016, p.13, Ls.8-15.)
Mr. Hart also has strong support from his family. Mr. Hart submitted letters of support
from his wife at the time, Sherry Hart (PSI, pp.8, 32-33), his other stepson, Joshua Amenkowicz
(PSI, pp.9, 35), and his grandchildren, Julianna, Bethany, and James Amenkowicz (PSI, pp.34,
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36-37.) Mr. Hart’s counsel told the district court those and other letters of support “show[] that
there has been strong support from his family for him, that there’s strong support for him in the
community.” (Tr., Oct. 31, 2016, p.11, L.22 – p.12, L.1.)
As previously discussed, the presentence report stated, “[b]ased on the level of assessed
risk and need, and other protective factors. . . the defendant appears to be a marginal candidate
for an order of probation.” (PSI, p.15.) Mr. Hart submits the above information shows his
character and attitudes indicate that the commission of another crime is unlikely. See I.C. § 192521(2)(i). However, the district court did not adequately consider the above factors. Thus,
Mr. Hart asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered his sentence into
execution rather than place him on probation.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Into Execution Mr. Hart’s Sentence,
Rather Than Retain Jurisdiction
In the alternative, Mr. Hart asserts the district court abused its discretion when it ordered
into execution his sentence rather than retain jurisdiction, because there is insufficient
information in the record to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate. The district court should have followed Mr. Hart’s alternative recommendation
and retained jurisdiction.
Retained jurisdiction is designed “to allow the trial court additional time to evaluate the
defendant’s rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation.” State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho
193, 194 (Ct. App. 1984). “Probation is the ultimate objective sought by a defendant who asks a
court to retain jurisdiction.” Id. (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982)).
Whether to place a defendant on probation is a choice “committed to the sound discretion of the
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trial court.” Id. Because probation is at issue, the standard of review for a district court decision
on whether to retain jurisdiction is the “clear abuse of discretion” standard, with a focus on the
criteria set forth in I.C. § 19-2521. Id. “Refusal to retain jurisdiction will not be deemed a ‘clear
abuse of discretion’ if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended
sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.” Id.
In Mr. Hart’s case, there is insufficient information in the record to determine that a
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate, based on the information and
arguments contained in Section I above and incorporated herein. Thus, the district court should
have followed Mr. Hart’s recommendation and retained jurisdiction.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hart’s Idaho Criminal Rule 35
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence
Mr. Hart asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence, in view of new and additional information presented to the
district court. “A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251,
253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). “The denial of a motion for modification of a sentence
will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.” Id. “The criteria for
examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining
whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when
pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction.” Id.
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Mr. Hart asserts that his sentence is excessive in view of new and additional information
presented with the motion for reduction. Specifically, Mr. Hart presented new and additional
information on his family support. The supplemental materials Mr. Hart filed in support of the
Rule 35 motion are letters from Sherry Hart and Joshua Amenkowicz.

(See R., p.127.)

Sherry Hart wrote, “[m]y family and I have offered Mark a clean and sober place to live, where
[he] can have his own room.” (R., p.129.) She also wrote, “[s]ince I’m retired I can provide
Mark with help, transportation to appointments so that he can make all court requirements.”
(R., p.129.) Ms. Hart further stated, “[m]y son Joshua is self-employed so he would be able to
offer Mark a job.” (R., p.129.)
In his letter, Joshua Amenkowicz wrote, “Mark Hart can stay with me when released
from incarceration, in [a] substance abuse free atmosphere. Mark Hart has been my step father
for over 30 years and is part of my family.” (R., p.130.) He also wrote, “I would make sure that
Mark meets all of the [court’s] requirements and obligations upon his release.” (R., p.130.)
The above new and additional information indicates Mr. Hart would have his family’s
support as he works to overcome his substance abuse issues, going so far as to provide him with
housing, transportation, and other assistance. Thus, Mr. Hart asserts that the district court abused
its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, in view of new and
additional information presented to the district court.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Hart respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence
as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, Mr. Hart respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
order denying his Rule 35 motion and remand the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2017.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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